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ABSTRAK 
 
Sejak Agenda Pembangunan Doha WTO dirumuskan terjadi perkembangan 
arah liberalisasi pedagangan. Di negara-negara OECD, keinginan untuk mengurangi 
bantuan domestik tampaknya agak lamban dan sejumlah negara berkembang agak 
enggan membuka pasarnya. Pada “paket Juli 2004” sejumlah negara anggota menyetujui 
adanya pengecualian perubahan pada beberapa produk, produk khas (special product) 
bagi negara berkembang dan produk peka (sensitive product) pada negara maju. 
Dengan memilih ‘paket Juli 2004’ sebagai titik awal, makalah ini mencoba menganalisis 
kepentingan Indonesian dalam perundingan pertanian dalam Agenda Pembangunan 
Doha. Penelitian ini menggunakan model ekonomi perdagangan dan produksi 
(pangkalan data dan analisis GTAP) untuk mengidentifikasi kemungkinan dampak 
skenario liberalisasi global yang realistis dalam semangat ‘paket Juli 2004’ pada 
perekonomian Indonesia. Pada keadaan perdagangan yang sudah berlangsung agak 
liberal di Indonesia saat ini dampak menyeluruh yang diharapkan pada pendapatan 
nasional, perdagangan dan produksi bernilai positif, tetapi terbatas. Untuk Indonesian 
liberalisasi global pertanian menjanjikan prospek yang positif untuk minyak sayuran dan 
produk ternak. Diduga terjadi pengaruh negatif dalam upaya melindungi sektor beras dan 
gula, yang akan dapat dikelola dengan biaya lumayan dengan menentukan beras 
sebagai produk khas. Skema pelarangan impor atau kuota terbatas akan menimbulkan 
penurunan tingkat kesejahteraan secara nyata. 
 
Kata kunci : Agenda Pembangunan Doha, liberalisasi perdagangan, produk khas, 
produk peka, dan perundingan pertanian 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Ever since the WTO Doha Development Agenda was formulated, there has 
been mixed development in the direction of global trade liberalization. The ambitions on 
reforming domestic support in OECD countries seem to be moderate, at best, and a 
number of developing countries are less inclined to open their markets through improved 
access. Under ‘July 2004 package’ members now agree on far reaching exemptions from 
reforms in individual products (special products for developing countries and sensitive 
products for developed countries). Taking the ‘July 2004 package’ as a starting point, this 
paper tries to assess Indonesian interests in the agricultural negotiations under the WTO 
Doha Development Agenda. This study uses a large-scale economic model of trade and 
production (GTAP data base and analysis) to identify the possible impact of a realistic 
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global liberalization scenario in the spirit of the ‘July 2004 package’ on the Indonesian 
economy. Given the prevailing quite liberal trade regime in Indonesia the expected overall 
impacts on national income, trade and production are positive, but rather limited. For 
Indonesian agriculture global liberalization offers positive prospects for vegetable oils and 
for animal products. There are small adverse effects on the protected rice and sugar 
sectors, which can be managed at modest costs by designating rice as special product 
(SP). An import ban or restrictive quota regime would entail significant welfare losses. 
 
Key words : Doha Development Agenda, GTAP, trade liberalization, special products, 
agricultural negotiation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the start of the Doha round in 2001 the scope for liberalization in 
agricultural trade has gradually declined. The recent ‘July 2004 package’ reveals 
that WTO members agree on far reaching exemptions from reforms in individual 
products (special products for developing countries and sensitive products for 
developed countries). The ambitions on reforming domestic support in OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries seem to 
be moderate, at best, and a number of developing countries is less inclined to 
open their markets through improved access. It is against this background that 
we formulate our DDA (Doha Development-round Agenda scenario). 
Several recent studies have shown that agricultural market access is 
one of the most important issues on the DDA (e.g. Anderson, 2004; Bouët et al 
2004b; Francois et al. 2003; World Bank, 2003). There is much focus on tariff 
reductions in the present paper. Section 2 provides background to the DDA, and 
provides input into the discussions on formulae through an analysis at tariff-line 
level. We find that any formula that reduces post-UR bound rates by less than 
80 per cent will leave most currently applied tariffs on agricultural imports into 
Indonesian untouched. Stated otherwise, Indonesia brings much capital to the 
negotiation table when it comes to improving other countries' access to its 
markets.  
This paper further discusses the interests of Indonesia in the agricultural 
negotiations under the DDA of the WTO. It uses a global model of trade and 
production to quantitatively assess the possible effects of a successful Doha 
round on the world and on the Indonesian economy.  
The GTAP (Global Trade and Analysis Project) model and database are 
geared to an analysis that provides most detail on the agricultural sectors in 
Indonesia, and the South and East Asian region (section 3). While the impact of 
the DDA on global income is modest, as reported in part 1 of section 4, 
Indonesia is one of the countries that reap above-average gains driven by the 
improved export performance in agriculture. The income form farming activities 
will rise. The export opportunities compensate by far the limited contraction of 
the rice and sugar sectors that occur as imports grow; designating rice a Special 
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Products/SPs will counteract contraction at modest costs (part 2 of section 4). 
Criteria design for (SPs) is a potential deadlock, however, that may consume 
much of the scarce negotiating resources that developing countries have at their 
disposal. Section 5 concludes that there are firm interests for Indonesia in the 
DDA. Some are on the defensive side, aimed at conserving flexibility for 
protectionist policies. Others are on the offensive side, and relate to the 
realization of export potential through domestic transformation of agriculture, and 
improved access to export markets. 
 
DOHA DEVELOPMENT-ROUND AGENDA 
 
The Doha Development Round aims to obtain “substantial improvement 
of market access, reduction of all export subsidies, in view of their progressive 
withdrawal, and substantial reduction of domestic support having effects on 
trade distortion”. These are the three "pillars" in the agriculture negotiations 
under the DDA: market access concerns reductions in tariffs and tariff rate 
quotas; domestic support concerns commitments to reduce trade-distorting farm 
income policies; export competition concerns the promotion of agricultural 
exports through direct subsidies, export credits, subsidy element in food aid and 
state trading enterprises. 
 
Domestic Support 
Domestic support to agriculture is monitored in the WTO according to 
the concept of the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), and member countries 
have agreed to bind and reduce their domestic support in the last multilateral 
trade round, the Uruguay Round (UR). The domestic support ceilings have 
never been binding since the UR for any member, partly due to the relatively soft 
definition of AMS that allows reallocation of expenditures between categories. 
Most importantly, a significant part of domestic support has been shifted to the 
so-called ‘Green box’ which contains support that is considered minimally trade 
distorting and is not subject to reductions. Similarly, the so-called ‘blue box’, 
used mainly by the EU/European Union, has not been subject to reductions, and 
might possibly be extended in the DDA. Bringing down AMS will, therefore, not 
always result in actual reduction in domestic support. 
Table 1 provides data on the subsidies from farm-income policies and 
export competition for selected countries and regions. These data are drawn 
from the OECD’s estimates of producer support and adjusted to fit the GTAP 
database.1 A negative number refers to a net tax on producers in that sector. It 
is evident that the European Union, North America (USA and Canada), Japan 
                                                          
1 The data does not include the so called ‘Market Price Support’ component, and is therefore lower 
than the OECD’s Producer Support Estimates (PSE). 
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and Korea choose to subsidize their agricultural sectors, while most of the 
developing countries are taxing their farmers.  
  
Table 1. Domestic Support and Export Competition (*) 
 
 Indo-  nesia ASEAN 
China   
P.R. 
Japan     
and     
Korea 
India EU-25 North  America Brazil 
South         
and       
Central 
America 
Australia      
and New 
Zealand 
All         
other 
countries 
% of value of output 
Rice -1 -2 -3 3 6 3 25 -1 0 1 0 
Sugar -7 -4 -2 0 0 0 1 -2 -1 2 -1 
Oilseeds -1 0 -2 35 3 42 27 1 -1 2 -1 
Grains -1 -11 -2 8 3 61 32 1 11 3 0 
Vegetable 
Oils -1 -1 -4 0 -1 0 0 -3 0 0 0 
Animal 
Products -1 -2 -2 1 0 3 2 -1 -1 1 -1 
Other 
agriculture  -1 -2 -2 3 5 9 18 1 0 1 -1 
Food 
processing -7 -13 -13 -19 -4 -4 0 -3 -3 -1 -2 
Source: GTAP version 6.4 pre-release (October 2004), calculations LEI 
(*) Negative number means a net tax, positive number means a net subsidy 
 
Export Subsidies 
Export subsidies have received much criticism from academics and 
policymakers, and are widely believed to be amongst the most trade distorting 
forms of policies. The issue has received high priority in the current Doha round 
of negotiations. Between the kick-off of the round with the Doha ministerial 
declaration (WTO, 2001) and the latest general council decision of July 2004 
(WTO, 2004), the wording on export subsidies has changed from  ‘…reductions 
of, with a view of phasing out ...’ to a much more ambitious  ‘… ensure the 
parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies..’. This signals a broad 
consensus that export subsidies will have to disappear over time.  
Under the Uruguay Round (UR) only direct subsidies were subject to 
discipline. While taking the removal of subsidies further, the DDA also addresses 
indirect forms of subsidization through various forms of institutional 
arrangements. These include food aid, officially supported export credits and 
state trading enterprises (STEs). The General Council decision (WTO, 2004) 
calls for the elimination of all forms of export subsidies, and Members have been 
instructed to work with the OECD to develop monitoring tools. The OECD (2000) 
study on export credits is the forerunner of much more work in this area. 
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The WTO (2002a) provides data on the notified usage of direct export 
subsidies between 1995- 2000. All direct export subsidies average at US$ 7 
billion annually. Of these, 90 per cent are from the EU (European Union), which 
is currently in the process of making sharp reductions in budget outlays on 
export subsidies. The dairy sector uses the largest share. The USA notified only 
US$ 487 million of direct export subsidies, but according to OECD (2000), the 
USA has been the largest user of export credits to subsidize exports. It is 
noteworthy that there are also positive notifications by developing countries, six 
of which did not make reduction commitments in the UR because they did not 
use them at the time. These countries are India, Korea, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Thailand and Tunisia. 
Export subsidies display a considerable volatility over the years. The 
amount of export subsidies depends on the vagaries of world markets, in 
combination with the desire of some countries to stabilize their own domestic 
markets. In value terms the volatility is even greater, since an additional price 
component enters the picture. 
 
Market Access in Agriculture 
Countries protect their domestic markets in a number of ways. The 
resulting pattern of protection measures is often complex and faces the exporter 
with a non-transparent administrative burden, involving tariffs, quota, technical 
standards, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, import licenses, infrastructure 
charges, and, increasingly popular after the UR, anti-dumping duties. All these 
measures tend to raise the domestic price of the imported good above its ‘world’ 
price, i.e. the price that the exporter actually receives.   
Tariffs are the most commonly applied form of import protection. Market 
access negotiations in the GATT/WTO have generally been based on tariff 
bindings, or schedules of concessions tabled under GATT (General Agreement 
on Tariff and Trade) rules that define a maximum or ceiling rate for trade 
restrictions. The coverage and level of these bindings is an important element of 
the initial conditions for the negotiations. While tariffs in the OECD (and Latin 
America) are generally bound, many Asian and African economy tariffs remain 
unbound despite more than a four-fold increase in the coverage of developing-
country tariff bindings in the Uruguay Round.  
For both industrial tariffs and agricultural tariffs, the phenomenon that 
bound rates exceed applied rates, or ‘binding overhang’ (Francois and Martin, 
2003) is an important element for the initial negotiations in the Doha round. The 
binding overhang – sometimes called 'water in the tariff' – reduces the 
effectiveness of bound tariff reductions. For example, Francois et al (2003) show 
that, in general, for developing countries, binding overhang is large enough that 
reductions in the range of 50 per cent are necessary to force any reductions at 
all in average applied rates for countries like Brazil. Below we analyze the level 
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of border protection in Indonesia. A more detailed discussion on the composition 
of agricultural tariffs, and the global pattern of protection is provided in 
Achterbosch et al. (2004). 
 
Patterns of Border Protection in Indonesia 
The current pattern of border protection in Indonesia, its profile of bound 
rates and its profile of applied rates determine the potential impact of the specific 
tariff reduction modalities that are to be agreed in the Doha negotiations. For 
Indonesia we observe that its applied protection is low on average, around 5 per 
cent in agri-food and slightly higher in manufacturing and textiles. We also see 
that the protection afforded is lower than the protection faced by Indonesian 
exporters, which points to potential export revenue gains from a multilateral 
reduction of tariffs.  
Below we present data obtained from the AMAD database, which 
contains information on bound ad valorem tariff rates in agriculture, as well as 
information on Tariff-Rate Quotas (TRQs).2 The bound rates are directly from 
Indonesia’s commitment schedule, and the AMAD database contains 1331 
Indonesian tariff lines at the HS-10 level. Figure 1 provides a picture of the tariff 
landscape. With the exception of a few peaks, the landscape is rather flat, with 
most bound tariffs in the range 40 – 60 per cent. The important exceptions are 
found in dairy, sugar, rice and beverages. See table 2-3 for summary statistics 
for the agricultural commodities only, and calculated at the HS-2 group level. We 
also estimate the current binding overhang, i.e. the difference between bound 
rates and the post-UR applied rates. The overhang is very large indeed and this 
reflects the fact that Indonesia has reduced its tariffs far below the UR 
commitments in the wake of the Asia crisis. The current low rates reflect an 
already liberal trade regime, with most tariffs around 5 per cent. Two exceptions 
are sugar and rice where specific tariffs are applied, and in the case of rice also 
quantitative import restrictions. Another exception is (alcoholic) beverages.  
The DDA negotiations on agriculture have introduced several 
approaches to achieve tariff reform. The EU has favoured a Uruguay Round 
approach in its agricultural proposals, which defines as the goal an average cut 
in tariffs. The Uruguay Round has in practice lead to the outcome that larger 
cuts were applied to tariffs that were already relatively low, while applying only 
modest reductions to high tariffs. 
  
                                                          
2 AMAD is a collaborative effort between USDA/ERS, OECD, Agriculture Canada, UNCTAD, FAO 
and the EC. See www.amad.org 
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Figure1. Post Uruguay Round Tariff Landscape Indonesia, Bound Rates 
 
 
The USA and the CAIRNS group have proposed a formula approach. 
The fundamental difference to a UR approach is that a formula approach sets 
out rules to cut tariffs on each tariff-line. Specifically, these countries proposed to 
apply a Swiss formula approach on account that it achieves higher proportional 
cuts in higher tariff rates and results in a maximum ceiling tariff per tariff line. 
The Swiss formula is the most appropriate modality for a reduction of address 
tariff escalation. The so-called Derbez text that emerged during the 2003 
Cancun ministerial proposed to combine both a UR approach and a Swiss 
formula in a ‘blended’ formula as a modality for market access negotiations. The 
more recent July package of 2004 speaks about ‘tiered formulae’, without 
specifying exactly what this might look like. See Sawit (2004) for a detailed 
analysis on Indonesia. 
Table 2 clearly shows that very substantial reductions in bound rates 
would be required to actually reduce Indonesian applied rates. Required 
reductions larger than 80 per cent are not uncommon, given the enormous 
binding overhang. Consequently, all of the suggested reduction modalities would 
have little impact on applied tariffs, but could reduce some of the bound rates 
substantially. The consequent reduction of binding overhang would limit 
Indonesia’s future ability to raise tariffs above current levels. 
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Table 2. Bound and Applied Tariff Rates Imposed by Indonesia (per cent ad valorem) 
 
 Bound rate, % Applied rate, % 
Reduction of 
bound rates, 
required to 
equalize bound 
and applied rate 
% 
HS  
1996 Commodity group Max Min Mean Max Min Mean  Mean 
01 Live animals 40 40 40 15 0 5  89 
02 Meat bovine and non-bovine 50 40 48 5 5 5  89 
03 Fish, fish products . . . 15 0 5  100 
04 Dairy, eggs and honey 210 40 90 5 0 4  92 
05 Hair and feather 40 40 40 5 0 4  91 
06 Ornamental plants 60 40 45 20 10 13  70 
07 Vegetables 50 40 45 5 0 5  89 
08 Nuts and  fruits 60 40 46 5 5 5  89 
09 Coffee, tea and spices 60 40 44 5 5 5  88 
10 Rice and cereals (*) 160 27 103 5 0 3  91 
11 Processed cereals (flours, flakes) and starch 40 9 36 5 0 4  87 
12 Oilseeds 40 27 40 5 0 4  90 
13 Vegetable saps 40 30 39 5 0 4  89 
14 Bamboo, rattan and other plant  fibres  40 40 40 5 0 2  95 
15 Vegetable oil and animal oils 60 35 42 10 0 5  88 
16 Animal products 40 40 40 5 5 5  88 
17 Sugar and –products (**) 95 40 54 5 5 5  88 
18 Cocoa products 40 40 40 5 5 5  88 
19 Cereal products 60 40 41 5 5 5  88 
20 Processed vegetables and –fruits 60 40 49 5 5 5  89 
21 Soya sauce and other food preparations 60 40 41 5 5 5  88 
22 Beverages 150 40 125 170 5 129  13 
23 Animal feed products 40 30 40 5 0 1  96 
24 Tobacco and –products 40 40 40 15 5 9  78 
Source: Bound rates are from AMAD database, Applied rates have been obtained from Departemen 
Pertanian. Calculations LEI 
Notes: Mean values per HS-2 group calculated from tariff-line data at HS-10 level; (*) For rice the 
bound rate includes estimate of the ad-valorem equivalent of specific tariffs. The column 
“applied rate” only contains the average of ad applied valorem tariffs. The current applied 
specific tariff is Rp 430/kg. At current world prices and exchange rates this is roughly 20% ad 
valorem. (**) For sugar the bound rate includes estimate of the ad-valorem equivalent of 
specific tariffs. The column “applied rate” only contains the average of applied ad valorem 
tariffs. The current applied specific tariff is Rp 700/kg for raw sugar (p 550/kg for cane sugar). 
At current world prices and exchange rates this amounts to roughly 30% ad valorem. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Model  
Our analysis uses calculations done with the general equilibrium model 
of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). The GTAP model is a comparative 
static multi-sector multi-region general equilibrium model. Each country or region 
is depicted within the same structural model. The regional household to which 
the income of factors, tariff revenues and taxes are assigned represents the 
consumer side. The regional household allocates its income to three expenditure 
categories: private household expenditures, government expenditures and 
savings. For the consumption of the private household, the non-homothetic 
Constant Difference of Elasticities (CDE) function is applied.  
A representative producer for each sector of a country or region makes 
production decisions to maximize profits by choosing inputs of labor, capital, and 
intermediates to produce a single sector output. Producers can substitute 
primary factors for each other, modeled with a Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
(CES) functional form, while intermediates are used in fixed proportions 
(Leontief). In the case of crop production, farmers also make decisions on land 
allocation. Intermediate inputs are produced domestically or imported, while 
primary factors cannot move across countries. Internationally traded 
commodities are assumed to be distinguished according to region of origin. 
Using this so-called Armington assumption implies that for example wheat 
imported from the US is different from wheat imported from the EU, and trade 
flows in both varieties have their own price tag. A great advantage of the 
Armington assumption is the possibility to model bilateral trade flows and 
bilateral trade policies.  
The welfare changes are measured by the equivalent variation. This 
tells us how much money can be taken away from the representative household, 
or must be given to the representative household, to make it as well off as 
without the policy change. In practice, the equivalent variation correlates with 
changes in real GDP.  We also report changes in farming income. This is 
measured as change in value added derived from agricultural activities, and 
hence excludes income from off-farm activities that the rural household may be 
engaged in. 
Taxes are included in the theory of the model at several levels. 
Production taxes are placed on intermediate or primary inputs, or on output. 
Some trade taxes are modeled at the border. Additional internal taxes can be 
placed on domestic or imported intermediate inputs, and may be applied at 
differential rates that discriminate against imports. Trade policy instruments are 
represented as import or export taxes/subsidies. A detailed discussion of the 
basic algebraic model structure of the GTAP model can be found in Hertel 
(1997). Our model is implemented in GEMPACK, a software package designed 
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for solving large applied general equilibrium models.  The model is solved as an 
explicit non-linear system of equations, through techniques described by 
Harrison and Pearson (1996).   
 
Scenarios 
The challenge in constructing scenarios is to translate bound rates and 
bound AMS ceilings, which are negotiated under DDA, into changes to the 
applied levels that can be incorporated in the modeling analysis. As usual one 
has to make simplifying assumptions to capture the spirit of the likely set of 
policy changes without being trapped into the details of the (legal) agreements. 
Our analysis of the impact of the DDA on the world and on Indonesia is 
structured around one central DDA scenario, which assumes the following with 
regard to the three pillars in the agricultural negotiations: 
- Market access: 30% reduction of applied levels of protection; 
- Domestic support: 5% reduction of applied levels; 
- Export subsidy: 75% reduction 
This scenario purports to reflect the current stance in the negotiations: 
substantial progress in market access albeit less in applied rates than in bound 
rates; limited progress on domestic support – despite strong commitments to 
lower AMS ceilings, perhaps – as the EU and the USA strive to expand the 
definition of the blue box and put increasing amounts of support in the green 
box; finally, we believe that very substantial reductions of export subsidies can 
be achieved in this round.   
In one of the scenarios we construct a potential modality for SP in 
developing countries along two lines. First, we see little fundamental difference 
between “sensitive products” proposed by OECD countries, and special 
products in developing countries. Special or sensitive are taken to be those 
products for which current levels of (bound) border protection are high. Second, 
we largely exempt sensitive/special products within this tariff range from 
liberalization by assuming a “symbolic” 5 per cent cut on applied support or 
border measures. 
 
Data 
We use the version 6.4 pre-release (September 2004) of the GTAP 
database that is benchmarked to the year 2001. A special feature of the 
database is the trade protection information that comes from the MacMaps 
database. This is a joint effort by the Centre d’études Prospectives et 
d’information Internationales (CEPII) and the International Trade Center 
(WTO/ITC). This database is used to convert tariffs applying to trade in products 
measured at a very disaggregate level (HS6) into their ad valorem equivalent. 
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The import protection measures include ad valorem tariffs, specific tariffs, quota, 
tariff rate quota regimes, and anti-dumping duties. These are all converted into 
ad valorem equivalents. An important feature of this dataset is its inclusion of 
existing trade preferences, including GSP (Generalized System of Preference), 
ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, AGOA (African Growth and 
Opportunity Act) and existing bilateral preferences. See Bouët et al (2004a) for a 
comprehensive documentation. 
Information on domestic agricultural support is consistent with OECD 
producer Support Estimate information, but limited to OECD members and a few 
non-members.  
The GTAP database contains economy-wide information 87 regions or 
individual countries and information on 57 commodities. For the purposes of this 
study we have aggregated those into 11 regions and 10 commodities, listed in 
Table 3.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Impact of the Doha Development Agenda 
As negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) proceed, 
the prospects for strong economic benefits from the round get bleaker. Below we 
report on the results of our model simulations under a realistic Doha scenario. 
 
Global Effects 
On the global level, we estimate gains of USD 11 billion in agriculture, 
and of USD 10 billion in non-agriculture. Because of the small share of 
agriculture in the global economy, the relative gain is much bigger in agriculture 
(0.6 per cent of global agricultural GDP) than in non-agriculture (0.04 per cent of 
global non-agricultural GDP). Figure 2 reveals the distribution of national income 
gains over the agriculture economy and the non-agriculture economy, by region. 
Several developing regions score well above the global average, notably India, 
the ASEAN countries, and Brazil. Of the OECD countries, those in the far East 
(Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand) reap substantial gains, which 
are largely driven by agricultural reforms in Japan and Korea. The benefits in the 
EU are in line with the EU share in the global economy. We report a slight net 
loss for the US, giving the US little incentive to push hard on a deal. The national 
income gain in Indonesia amounts to 0.3 per cent of GDP, far above the world 
average. Most gains occur in manufacturing and services. 
Under the agriculture negotiations, the July package reveals that little 
action is expected on the critical pillars of domestic support and market access. 
Consequently, the gains in agriculture are quite small. What is the contribution of 
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the three pillars to these global gains? 94 per cent of gains relate to improved 
market access for agricultural products, 4 per cent to reduced domestic support 
and just 1 per cent to the downscaling of export competition policies. The 
agriculture dossier under the Doha Round seems to have made most progress 
under a pillar that shows little potential for substantial welfare gains in 
developing countries. 
 
Table 3. Aggregation of The Data Base 
 
 Commodities Regions 
1 Rice Indonesia 
2 Sugar ASEAN (excl. Indonesia) 
3 Oilseeds China P.R. 
4 Grains Japan and Korea (JAKO) 
5 Vegetable Oils India 
6 Animal Products EU-25 
7 Other agriculture  North America (US and Canada) 
8 Food processing Brazil 
9 Manufactures South and Central America 
10 Services Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) 
11  All other countries 
 
 
Figure 2. National Income Effects of a DDA Liberalization in All Sectors 
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The Impact of the Doha Round on Indonesia 
Trade theory is straightforward in predicting that the gains from global 
liberalization accrue to those countries that remove their own distortions. Yet, 
Indonesia has quite a liberal trade regime, and few public means are allocated to 
support agricultural production or exports. This explains why the Doha round 
does little to boost Indonesian GDP (Figure 2).  
Comparing the impact on Indonesia with the rest of ASEAN, what strikes 
is that the gain in the latter region from countries opening up their markets is 
about four times bigger. Basically, the other ASEAN countries are able to 
materialize more export gains than Indonesia. The implication is that Indonesia – 
being a part of the global trading system – should aim to fulfill more of its export 
potential in order to derive firm benefits from the system. In addition, we see that 
Indonesia reaps indirect benefits from participating in a global liberalization 
effort. The matter returns below. First, we zoom in on the results of DDA reform 
for Indonesia. 
Sectoral impact:  Figure 3 compares the changes in value of output in 
sectors of the Indonesian economy. It should be read as an indication for 
changing patterns of specialization after reform.  
 
Figure 3. Output in Indonesia After Doha Reform, by Sector (per cent change) 
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In Indonesia most food crops are largely unaffected, and there is a 
substantial expansion in food production. For rice the share of domestic rice in 
consumption decreases slightly as a result of import growth of 20 per cent. 
Imports of sugar, already about half of domestic consumption, grow by an 
additional 10 per cent. The decline in rice and sugar farming allows resources to 
move into animal production and the oilseed/vegetable oil production, which 
both expand by 3 to 6 per cent. Looking just at quantities of output, there is 2.5 
per cent growth in oilseeds and animal products, and over 6 per cent in 
vegetable oil. 
The opportunities in animal products and vegetable oil relate to policy 
changes in Japan and Korea, which open up the highly protected market for rice, 
grains and oilseeds in these regions. ASEAN countries and North America fill 
the gap. More resources in these countries are absorbed by rice production, 
which opens up opportunities for Indonesia to increase its share on world 
markets for oilseed crops and vegetable oil. As the EU, Japan and Korea reduce 
their strong policies on dairy, beef and other animal products, Indonesia can be 
among the countries that expand their livestock sectors, albeit in strong 
competition with Brazil, Oceania, and other ASEAN countries. 
Below we discuss in more detail the impact on agriculture of a DDA 
reform that covers only agriculture and food. 
Farm income:  There will, of course, be a consequent adjustment in the 
revenues from farming over the various sectors. Figure 4 provides detail on the 
changes to real farmer income from a DDA reform, and to the drivers of 
change.3 Regarding the level of farm income, we find strong losses in the OECD 
countries that result from reduced levels of trade-distorting support; losses are 
fully compensated, however, through increased support under the Green Box. 
Farmers in emerging Asia – Indonesia included – gain under DDA, largely 
because of increased prices for their output (Table 4). The results for Indonesia 
have to be interpreted with care because farming is often a part-time activity. In 
the lowland and upland area the share of agricultural (and fishing) activities in 
income is just about 50 per cent, in the coastal area it is just one-third.4  
We report on changes to the income from farming activities only, and 
exclude the returns from fishing activities from the analysis. It will be clear that a 
proper analysis of the household impact from trade liberalization will have to 
include the effect on off-farm income. 
We find that average real income from farming (all activities) in 
Indonesia could increase by 1.2 per cent after the DDA reform of global 
agricultural policies. For the potential gain to materialize, farmers will need to 
shift resources into the production of vegetable oil and animal products. 
                                                          
3  Change in real farm income is calculated as the CPI-deflated change in value added of 
agricultural activities. 
4 These data are ICASERD data for 2001. 
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Figure 4. Impact of DDA on Farm Income, by Region (per cent change) 
 
  
Table 4. Farm Revenue After DDA Reform (per cent change to base data) 
 
 Output (1) 
Price 
(2) 
Farm revenue 
(1+2) 
Rice -0.67 0.24 -0.43 
Sugar -0.56 0.19 -0.37 
Oilseeds 2.36 1.40 3.76 
Cereals 0.29 0.68 0.97 
Vegetable oil 6.45 0.27 6.72 
Animal products 2.70 0.57 3.27 
Source: model simulations 
 
The decomposition of the total change allows us to pinpoint the policies 
that drive change. Keep in mind our scenario design! The reduction of export 
subsidies and domestic support bears little impact outside the EU and Oceania 
(Australia and New Zealand). Nonetheless, Indonesian farmers benefit from 
rising market prices for their rice and oilseeds – as support policies become less 
distorting or decline, supply contracts, and prices rise. Increased market access 
is the biggest cause of adjustments worldwide. Indonesian export opportunities 
improve under the Asian rice domino; when Japan and Korea open up their 
markets for rice from the ASEAN region, Indonesian farmers get opportunities to 
step up their exports of animal products and vegetable oil, and take over market 
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share from other ASEAN countries in these products. We find that a removal of 
protection on Indonesian agriculture slightly reduces farm income by about 0.4 
per cent, a reflection of the minor contraction in rice and sugar production. 
Most rural households are net buyers of food, i.e. consumption 
outweighs household supply. Although real farm income rises, the net impact on 
the rural household is likely to be negative. The income gain is partially based on 
the upward pressure on prices for agricultural products. The net impact in the 
household depends on their food balance. Hertel et al. (2004) show that poor 
agricultural households in Indonesia are likely to witness a net income drop in 
the face of global liberalization, as their food budget rises without being fully 
compensated by rising remuneration for their activities. 
Employment and wages: Before we discuss the impact of reform on 
employment and wages, first a note on the specification of the labor market in 
the GTAP analysis. In the analysis we assume full employment of labor 
resources at all times in the analysis. This reflects our hypothesis that trade 
reform will not increase 
total demand for labor.5 In the agricultural economy in Indonesia, chances are 
bigger that trade reform will alter the structure of labor demand than its volume, 
basically because the labor force is already fully employed in farm and off-farm 
activities. The output changes reported above will affect the distribution over 
sectors. In addition, we expect the distribution of labor over the formal and 
informal economy to change, an effect that we cannot quantify. 
We find that labor demand shifts follows the shifts in agricultural 
production, i.e. a slight reduction of the demand for labor in rice and sugar 
farming (and the processing of these crops) by less than 1 per cent; substantial 
increases of 2.5 to 4.5 per cent in the sectors vegetable oil and animal products. 
The agricultural economy specializes more into the supply of vegetable oil and 
animal products, which require more land and capital per unit of product, and 
less labor than rice and sugar. By consequence, wages decrease somewhat in 
comparison to wage levels in ASEAN and other East Asian regions, which 
experience the inversed output trend. In Indonesia the increase of land rents by 
1 per cent transfers income from land laborers to land owners. As trade theory 
predicts, the reduced border protection on manufactures results in a decline of 
domestic capital prices. The decline is partly undone by an increased demand 
for capital from agriculture. 
The realization of potential gains: The results indicate that a key 
challenge to Indonesia is to improve export performance in agriculture. Globally, 
enterprises in the food sector have incorporated consumer concerns and 
regulatory demands regarding health, quality and the environment into their 
production, marketing and distribution activities. The core of large retailers and 
                                                          
5 We assume full employment not only for labour but for land as well. This specification limits the 
scale of national income gains because we do not allow the endowment stock to grow. 
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trans-national “agribusiness” corporations has introduced various technical 
specifications that govern quality and safety of local and imported food products, 
e.g. the guidelines from EurepGAP and British Retail Consortium.6 As tariffs 
decline in global food trade, such technical standards that importers impose 
become the more impeding trade barriers. They were once skillfully described as 
'the emerging rocks in the ebbing tide.' 
The organizational response has generally been to integrate buyers and 
sellers within so-called supply chains, which is controlled by the dominant link in 
the chain. In many cases this requires direct investments of the controlling link 
into the primary stages of production. For such chains to reach out to agriculture 
in Indonesia requires quality and stability of supply, and a sound investment 
climate. The constructive attitude towards liberalization under the WTO signals a 
drive towards openness in Indonesia, which improves investment climate. Such 
intangible benefits from the WTO will support the value adding in agriculture 
through processing and exports. 
 
Exempting SPs from Multilateral Liberalization  
In the previous section we looked at the effects of a possible outcome of 
the Doha round, but without taking into account the important issue of ‘special 
products’. Members agreed in the July package that   
“Developing country Members will have the flexibility to designate an 
appropriate number of products as Special Products, based on criteria 
of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs. These 
products will be eligible for more flexible treatment. The criteria and 
treatment of these products will be further specified during the 
negotiation phase and will recognize the fundamental importance of 
Special Products to developing countries.” 
At the same time, developed country members are also granted 
considerable leeway by allowing them so-called ‘sensitive products’ that will also 
receive a more ‘flexible’ treatment with regard to market access commitments: 
“Without undermining the overall objective of the tiered approach, 
Members may designate an appropriate number, to be negotiated, of 
tariff lines to be treated as sensitive, taking account of existing 
commitments for these products.” 
Developed countries will designate those products ‘sensitive’ that are 
currently subject to regulated trade under tariff rate quota (TRQ). The text 
speaks of no justification in the case of sensitive products. By contrast, 
                                                          
6 In marketing, standards operate as a response to an increasing demand for differentiation and 
quality (including safety) in food consumption. In production, standards are instrumental to 
achieving efficiency gains within a food chain, by reducing waste, co-ordination cost and 
incompatibility between links in the chain (Reardon et al., 2001). 
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developing countries will have to justify the designation of SPs according to food 
security, rural development, and similar considerations. Criteria design is a 
potential deadlock, however, that will draw heavy on the Geneva delegations of 
developing countries. Instead these might want to propose self-designation of 
SPs, quite in line with the approach of developed countries. 
At this point it is difficult/impossible to foresee the outcomes on SPs. 
Still, we have undertaken to estimate the possible effects of exempting products 
from liberalization efforts. The coarse nature of our commodity aggregation limits 
the choice of products. In the simulation experiment, we therefore allow each 
region to designate at most one product as SP.  
In order to arrive at some general principles for designation of SPs, we 
have used two simple indicators: (i) the existing level of border protection. 
Assuming that existing protection patterns reveals countries’ preferences as to 
what they see as products that deserve protection, we select those agricultural 
products that currently have the highest applied tariffs. This indicator is 
combined with (ii) the output-weighted contribution to total farm income. This 
indicator should reveal the importance of the commodity concerned for rural 
incomes, and we choose those products that contribute the highest shares. All 
this leads us to a rather simple list: for all the Asian countries we assume rice to 
be a special product, except for India, where we assume vegetable oils to be of 
particular importance; the EU is very likely to continue some form of restrictive 
sugar policies, in spite of recent moves towards reforms of the EU sugar regime; 
for North America and South-and Central-America we assume animal products 
to be special; finally, Brazil, the Oceania region and our heterogeneous ‘rest of 
world’ are not assumed to designate SPs. 
Modelling SPs: Our implementation of SPs is very straightforward, and 
is certainly an oversimplified representation of what will eventually be negotiated 
in the Doha round: we simply assume that members choose not to liberalize 
policies in their SPs. That is, they do not commit to further reductions in market 
access barriers, and if applicable no reduction of domestic support and no 
reduction of export subsidies. 
Table 5 reveals the economy-wide welfare effects, from excluding SPs 
in the worldwide liberalization efforts. The world as a whole would forego 2.2 
billion US$, or about 20 per cent, relative to the original 11.2 billion US$ gains 
(21.1 billion US$ including manufactures) discussed in the previous section. The 
foregone income gain is unequally distributed, though. It is mainly the high 
income regions that have high current protection levels and choose not to 
liberalize their sensitive products that would potentially loose: Not reforming the 
EU25 sugar regime and maintaining the practice of export subsidization implies 
a net loss of about 1.4 billion US$. Similarly, not opening the highly protected 
rice markets in Japan and Korea leads to a drop in welfare equivalent to 1.1 
billion US$ in this region, with a negative welfare impact on rice exporting 
regions in Asia.  
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Even more disturbing is the effect on real farm incomes. While farm 
incomes in Japan and Korea and in the EU25 would rise relative to the original 
scenario, the low-income regions in our model would see a (very) slight, and 
negligible drop in their farming incomes. Hence, while high-income regions 
would transfer resources from consumers and citizens to farmers in sensitive 
products, farmers in low-income countries would not experience significant 
income gains from the exclusion of SPs. The reason for this result is that the 
multilateral non-inclusion of products in the liberalization efforts hampers export 
opportunities for low-income countries. This is especially evident in the rice 
(Japan and Korea) and sugar (EU25) case. To Indonesia, the decline in export 
opportunities due to SPs is insignificant in our model. 
 
Table 5. Welfare Change After Designating Special Products (million US dollar) 
 
Countries/regionsa 
Total EV 
Million US$ 
1 = 2+3+4 
Border 
protection 
2 
Export 
subsidies 
3 
Domestic 
support 
4 
Real farm 
income (%) 
5 
Indonesia 4 -4 8 0 -0.02 
ASEAN -48 -78 31 -1 -0.9 
China 58 -12 71 0 -0.06 
Japan and Korea -1133 -1381 270 -22 1.11 
India 2 4 -2 0 -0.06 
EU-25 -1377 -120 -1273 15 1.37 
North America -697 -685 -21 9 -0.83 
Brazil -17 39 -56 0 -0.22 
South and Central 
America 
-24 -114 89 1 -0.45 
Australia and New 
Zealand 
49 161 -110 -3 0.21 
Rest of the World 946 -104 1050 -1 -0.27 
TOTAL -2239 -2293 57 -3 - 
Source: model simulations 
Note: table reports changes in income due to SPs, relative to Doha scenario without SPs 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
This paper has employed a large-scale economic model to quantify 
potential interests of Indonesia in the agricultural negotiations under the Doha 
Development Agenda. As with all such modeling studies the analysis represents 
an abstraction from many details and could be refined in various ways. From our 
analysis we can draw a number of conclusions and policy recommendation. 
(1) Indonesia's quite liberal trade regime emerged in the wake of the 
financial crisis in Asia during the late 1990s. Given low applied protection in 
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Indonesia, we estimate only small economy-wide welfare (efficiency) gains from 
own reforms. In fact, all effects of trade reform are rather small because the 
integration of Indonesian agriculture with global markets is quite limited. Small 
simulated drops in rice and sugar incomes are more than compensated through 
expansion in vegetable oils and animal products. Overall, this results in a small 
improvement of farmers’ incomes. The realization of these potential benefits 
depends on the ability to shift resources into these promising areas of 
agricultural production. Indonesia’s active participation in the DDA might 
facilitate this process of change through its impact on the investment climate in 
the country. 
(2) The results quantify a range of interests of Indonesia in the 
agriculture negotiation. Some are on the defensive side, aimed at conserving 
flexibility for protectionist policies. Others are on the offensive side, and relate to 
the realization of export potential through domestic transformation of agriculture, 
and improved access to export markets. 
Defensive interests of Indonesia in the negotiations include: (i) Current 
applied tariffs are very low, while bound rates are high. The resulting binding 
overhang gives a lot of flexibility to increase border protection should Indonesia 
want to protect domestic activities from world markets. (ii) Formula reductions of 
bound rates will have a limited impact on applied rates. A tiered formula retains 
flexibility, especially if ‘special products’ are to be exempted from reduction 
commitments. (iii) In rice we find a double-digit rise of imports in the DDA 
scenario due to reduced border protection at slightly rising world prices. The 
import surge could be mitigated through designating rice as special product 
(SP). The cost of this price-based policy in terms of national income loss is 
limited, while an import ban or restrictive quota regime would entail significant 
welfare losses. Not only would an import ban lead to losses in consumer 
welfare, through more restricted availability, but the country would also forego 
tariff revenues. Criteria design for SPs is a potential deadlock, however. (iv) 
Safeguards are an alternative to requesting high bound tariffs for stabilization 
purposes. To the extent that Indonesia will be able to negotiate higher bound 
tariffs on some agricultural products, the case for a safeguard mechanism in 
addition is diminished. However, if bound rates come down then it might be 
worthwhile to consider safeguard mechanisms. 
Offensive interests in the negotiations include: (i) Domestic support 
reduction by OECD is estimated to have small negative impacts on the net 
importing Indonesian economy through higher import prices. However, higher 
world sugar prices that would result from some reforms in OECD countries 
would support expansion of the sugar sector in Indonesia. (ii) The simulations 
show a limited effect on Indonesia of improved market access to other countries. 
The limited realization of export potential is due to current specialization pattern. 
Diversification into first-stage processing to add value to primary products would 
lead to positive prospects in animal products and vegetable oils. (iii) If 
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aggressive opening of other markets is attained, Indonesia will also have to 
lower its own bound rates, hence loosing some flexibility. This flexibility can be 
regained through pushing for a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) and/or 
Special Products (SP). Alternatively, maintaining global protection levels would 
also leave Indonesia’s flexibility untouched, but this comes at the cost of 
foregoing future benefits of opening markets. 
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